A Cold War In The Courtrooms: What IOMed Means For International Law

On the warm metropolitan evening of 30th May 2025 in Hong Kong, a coalition of 85 countries and over 20 international organisations, spearheaded by China, converged to discretely note the establishment of IOMed- the prototype of an international entity touted to 'offer a new option to all countries for party-owned and efficient resolution of international disputes'. Indeed, the genesis of such a clearly rivalrous entity poses many implications for Sino-American relations, the stature and meaning of international law, and the nature of what is right and wrong in a world of pandemic politicisation.

This article explores the argument that IOMed is more than a functional tool; it is a symptom of a deeper systemic shift— one in which international law is becoming a site of ideological contestation, and where the very meaning of neutrality, legitimacy, and legal authority is being renegotiated. This shift does not necessarily signal decay, but it does reflect a transition away from the post-Cold War consensus on the role and universality of international legal norms.

Rethinking Neutrality in Institutional Design

IOMed’s operational model is designed around consensual, non-binding mediation, distinct from adjudicative forums like the ICJ or WTO dispute panels. It emphasises procedural flexibility, voluntary participation, and a professional but geographically diverse pool of mediators. Its structure is in many ways a response to critiques of older institutions: that they are overly formal, politically captured, or insufficiently representative of non-Western states.

Importantly, IOMed does not challenge the sovereignty of states. It offers no legally binding rulings, and cannot impose itself on parties without consent. This design is not incidental but strategic: it seeks to provide a platform for diplomacy where legal contestation can occur without escalation, and where mediation becomes a space for negotiation rather than judgment.

Yet the very features that make IOMed attractive to many states — its flexibility, its neutrality, its detachment from enforceable outcomes — also reflect a wider retreat from the normative ambitions of earlier international legal projects. In a world increasingly defined by power rivalry and fragmentation, neutrality is no longer taken as a given but must be continually constructed and defended.

Multipolarity and the Role of Legal Institutions

The context in which IOMed was created matters. Its foundation follows a decade of growing competition between the U.S. and China over the governance of global institutions. Both powers have sought to shape international law in line with their values and interests: the United States often foregrounding human rights, liberal economic norms, and institutional conditionality; China advocating for sovereignty, non-interference, and development-focused multilateralism.

In this environment, IOMed may serve different symbolic and strategic functions for different actors. For some Global South states, it represents an opportunity to engage in dispute resolution on more equitable procedural terms. For China and other emerging powers, it offers an alternative to Western-dominated forums, without directly opposing them. And for the U.S. and its allies, it may appear as a vehicle for soft influence that subtly challenges long-standing legal norms — even if it does so without direct confrontation.

From this perspective, IOMed might be seen less as a corrective to a broken system than as a manifestation of institutional diversification in a multipolar legal order. It coexists with, rather than replaces, other mechanisms. But its emergence nonetheless reflects a profound reality: that there is no longer a shared consensus on how disputes should be resolved, or what counts as a legitimate legal authority.

From Law as Norm to Law as Process

What IOMed reveals is a broader conceptual evolution in international law — from a framework grounded in normative claims about rights, justice, and accountability to one increasingly focused on procedural accommodation and political management.

This shift is not unique to IOMed, nor necessarily negative. Many states have long sought more adaptable and culturally sensitive legal mechanisms, and mediation has proven effective in contexts where legal rigidity might fuel resistance. However, when mediation becomes the default framework for addressing even fundamental legal questions — such as territorial sovereignty, treaty violations, or large-scale rights abuses — it risks relegating normative disagreement to process-oriented solutions.

In such a world, international legal institutions do not determine what is right or wrong, but merely provide a forum for dialogue. This may be desirable in terms of diplomacy, but it raises the question: if law is no longer a space of judgment, can it still function as a system of collective ethics?

A Cold War of Legal Authority?

It is in this context that some observers have begun to speak of a new “Cold War” — not simply geopolitical, but legal and moral. The Cold War of the 20th century was marked by competing ideologies, military blocs, and rival claims to legitimacy. The emerging contest between the U.S. and China reflects similar dynamics, though less overtly militarised and more institutionally diffuse.

IOMed’s existence within this evolving landscape suggests that international law is increasingly pluralistic and contested — not just in its application, but in its foundations. The law is no longer merely a terrain of compliance; it is a site of ideological contestation over the meaning of fairness, order, and justice.

This does not mean that law has lost relevance. On the contrary, it means that legal forms remain powerful tools — but that their authority may now be conditional, shaped by context, power, and alignment. IOMed may thrive precisely because it avoids strong normative commitments. But in doing so, it may also reflect the loss of a shared belief in the universal aspirations of law itself.